We ask when a normal-form game yields a single equilibrium prediction, even if players can coordinate by delegating play to an intermediary such as a platform or a cartel. Delegation outcomes are modeled via coarse correlated equilibria (CCE) when the intermediary cannot punish deviators, and via the set of individually rational correlated profiles (IRCP) when it can. We characterize games in which the IRCP or the CCE is unique, uncovering a structural link between these solution concepts. Our analysis also provides new conditions for the uniqueness of classical correlated and Nash equilibria that do not rely on the existence of dominant strategies. The resulting equilibria are robust to players' information about the environment, payoff perturbations, pre-play communication, equilibrium selection, and learning dynamics. We apply these results to collusion-proof mechanism design.

翻译：本文探讨在何种条件下，标准型博弈能产生唯一的均衡预测，即使参与者可通过委托平台或卡特尔等中介进行协调。当中介无法惩罚偏离者时，委托结果通过粗相关均衡（CCE）建模；当中介能够实施惩罚时，则通过个体理性相关策略集（IRCP）建模。我们刻画了IRCP或CCE具有唯一性的博弈类型，揭示了这些解概念之间的结构关联。该分析还为经典相关均衡与纳什均衡的唯一性提供了新条件，这些条件不依赖于占优策略的存在性。所得均衡对参与者的环境信息、收益扰动、预博弈沟通、均衡选择及学习动态具有稳健性。我们将这些结果应用于防合谋机制设计。