The ever increasing push towards reliance upon computerised technology in commercial, general, and military aerospace brings with it an increasing amount of potential cyber hazards and attacks. Consequently, the variety of attack vectors is greater than ever. Recognized Good Practice standards such as DO 326A and ED 202A attempt to address this by providing guidelines for cyber security on in-service aircraft, though implementation work for such initiatives is still in early stages. From previous work on in service aircraft, the authors have determined that one of the key challenges is that of the retrospective application of new regulations to existing designs. This can present significant requirements for time, money, and Suitably Qualified and Experienced Personnel resource, things which are often in already limited supply in military environments. The authors have previously explored efficient ways of approaching compliance, with promising results. There is still the need to consider this retroactivity challenge in tandem with other key factors affecting the application of CSA, in order to determine any more potential mitigating actions that could lower the barrier to effective and efficient implementation of secure approaches in the air domain. This work explores the interrelated challenges surrounding real-world applications of CSA and the beginnings of how these may be overcome.

翻译：商用、通用及军用航空领域对计算机化技术依赖程度的持续提升，带来了日益增多的潜在网络危害与攻击。因此，攻击向量的种类比以往任何时候都更为丰富。诸如DO 326A和ED 202A等公认良好实践标准，试图通过为在役飞机提供网络安全指南来应对这一问题，尽管此类举措的实施工作仍处于早期阶段。基于先前对在役飞机的研究，作者发现关键挑战之一在于将新法规追溯应用于现有设计。这可能对时间、资金以及合格且经验丰富的人员资源提出重大需求，而这些资源在军事环境中通常已十分有限。作者此前已探索了实现合规性的高效方法，并取得了令人鼓舞的成果。但仍需将此追溯性挑战与影响航空网络安全应用的其他关键因素相结合进行考量，以确定更多潜在的缓解措施，从而降低在航空领域有效且高效实施安全方案的障碍。本研究探讨了航空网络安全实际应用中的相互关联挑战，并初步探索了克服这些挑战的途径。