Collaborative virtual queueing has been proposed as a mechanism to mitigate airport surface congestion while preserving airline autonomy over aircraft-level pushback decisions. A central coordinator can regulate aggregate pushback capacity but cannot directly control which specific aircraft are released, limiting its ability to steer system-level performance. We propose a noncooperative coordination mechanism for collaborative virtual queueing based on the correlated equilibrium concept, which enables the coordinator to provide incentive-compatible recommendations on aircraft-level pushback decisions without overriding airline autonomy. To account for uncertainty in airlines' internal cost assessments, we introduce chance constraints into the correlated equilibrium formulation. This formulation provides explicit probabilistic guarantees on incentive compatibility, allowing the coordinator to adjust the confidence level with which airlines are expected to follow the recommended actions. We further propose a scalable algorithm for computing chance-constrained correlated equilibria by exploiting a reduced-rank structure. Numerical experiments demonstrate that the proposed method scales to realistic traffic levels up to 210 eligible pushbacks per hour, reduces accumulated delay by up to approximately 8.9% compared to current first-come-first-served schemes, and reveals a trade-off between confidence level, deviation robustness, and achievable cost efficiency.

翻译：协同虚拟排队已被提出作为一种缓解机场地面拥堵同时保持航空公司对飞机级推出决策自主权的机制。中央协调器能够调节总体推出容量，但无法直接控制具体哪些飞机被放行，这限制了其引导系统级性能的能力。我们提出一种基于相关均衡概念的非合作协同机制用于协同虚拟排队，该机制使协调器能够在无需凌驾航空公司自主权的前提下，提供激励相容的飞机级推出决策建议。为考虑航空公司内部成本评估的不确定性，我们在相关均衡模型中引入机会约束。该模型为激励相容性提供了明确的概率保证，使协调器能够调整航空公司遵循建议行动的置信水平。通过利用降秩结构，我们进一步提出一种可扩展算法来计算机会约束相关均衡。数值实验表明，所提方法可扩展至每小时210架次符合条件推出量的实际交通水平，与当前先到先服务方案相比累计延误减少约8.9%，并揭示了置信水平、偏差鲁棒性与可达成成本效率之间的权衡关系。