This paper analyzes the Internet shutdown that occurred in Iran in January 2026 in the context of protests, focusing on its impact on the country's digital communication infrastructure and on information access and control dynamics. The scale, complexity, and nation-state nature of the event motivate a comprehensive investigation that goes beyond isolated reports, aiming to provide a unified and systematic understanding of what happened and how it was observed. The study is guided by a set of research questions addressing: the characterization of the shutdown via the timeline of the disruption events and post-event "new normal"; the detectability of the event, encompassing monitoring initiatives, measurement techniques, and precursory signals; and the interplay between censorship and circumvention, assessing both the imposed restrictions and the effectiveness of tools designed to bypass them. To answer these questions, we adopt a multi-source, multi-perspective methodology that integrates heterogeneous public data, primarily from grey literature produced by network measurement and monitoring initiatives, complemented by additional private measurements. This approach enables a holistic view of the event and allows us to reconcile and compare partial observations from different sources.

翻译：本文分析了2026年1月伊朗在抗议背景下发生的网络断连事件，聚焦其对国家数字通信基础设施、信息获取与控制动态的影响。该事件规模宏大、结构复杂且具有国家行为体属性，亟需开展超越孤立报道的综合研究，旨在提供关于事件经过及其观测方式的统一、系统性理解。本研究通过一系列研究问题展开探讨：基于断连事件的时间线及事后"新常态"对断网特征进行界定；事件的可检测性，涵盖监测举措、测量技术及前兆信号；审查与规避的互动机制，评估所施加的限制措施及绕过这些限制的工具的有效性。为解答上述问题，我们采用多源、多视角的研究方法，整合异构公共数据（主要来源于网络测量与监测倡议的灰色文献，辅以私人测量数据）。该方法实现了对事件的整体认知，并使我们能够协调来自不同来源的局部观测结果并进行比较分析。