This study introduces a novel cooperative game theory model designed to improve the United Nations' current funding mechanisms, which predominantly rely on voluntary contributions. By shifting from a Nash equilibrium framework, where member states act in self-interest, to a cooperative model, the proposed approach aligns each country's financial contributions with the benefits they derive from UN activities. The model ensures a more sustainable and equitable system by introducing personalized pricing based on derived utility. Using agent-based simulations, the research demonstrates that the suggested approach increases global utility, reduces free-rider issues, and creates a more efficient resource allocation system. The findings suggest that the proposed model can optimize UN funding, ensuring a more stable and effective framework for global public goods provision, while considering the varying economic capacities of member states. Further research is recommended to assess the political viability of the model.

翻译：本研究提出了一种新颖的合作博弈论模型，旨在改进联合国当前主要依赖自愿捐款的资助机制。通过从成员国基于自身利益行事的纳什均衡框架转向合作模型，所提出的方法将各国的财政贡献与其从联合国活动中获得的收益相协调。该模型通过引入基于所得效用的个性化定价，确保了一个更可持续和公平的体系。利用基于主体的模拟，研究表明所建议的方法提高了全球效用，减少了搭便车问题，并创建了一个更高效的资源分配系统。研究结果表明，所提出的模型能够优化联合国融资，在考虑成员国不同经济能力的同时，为全球公共产品供给提供一个更稳定和有效的框架。建议进一步研究以评估该模型的政治可行性。